“A Failure of Initiative”

In many respects, our report is a litany of mistakes, misjudgments, lapses, and absurdities all cascading together, blinding us to what was coming and hobbling any collective effort to respond.

Now that “A Failure of Initiative” has come out, one hopes that people will stop watching television, shopping, driving around, or whatever the hell they’re doing long enough to download this report and read at least the preface and executive summary, because it’s only eight pages total. And then I hope it makes them good and mad – mad enough to demand more accountability – from bureaucrats, from the President and. . . from the Congress. Congressman Melancon was right on point when he said that the majority report doesn’t adequately assign responsibility for the failed disaster response, but I wonder if he was including himself and his colleagues in that list of responsible parties.

Time and time again I read in the report that “the government” failed. Not to let the bureaucracy off the hook (they in essence are the adult supervision in such matters), the government isn’t just FEMA or Department of Homeland Security. The government is also Congress, the President, and all of us. Either directly or by default (by not voting, or speaking out), we’ve encouraged Congress and the President to shape the priorities, agendas and funding of government agencies. We’ve encouraged Congress and the President to have DHS focused on all the fun paramilitary stuff designed to prevent terrorism to the exclusion of the disaster response and mitigation, ironically, something we would desperately need, if the terrorists were to get through in a big way. . ..

So, it’s time to take our medicine. The report was available fairly late in the day on Wednesday, and I’ve only started skimming it, but here are the big-picture conclusions in the executive summary:

The accuracy and timeliness of National Weather Service and National Hurricane Center forecasts prevented further loss of life

The Hurricane Pam exercise reflected recognition by all levels of government of the dangers of a category 4 or 5 hurricane striking New Orleans

Levees protecting New Orleans were not built for the most severe hurricanes

The failure of complete evacuations led to preventable deaths, great suffering, and further delays in relief

Critical elements of the National Response Plan were executed late, ineffectively, or not at all

DHS and the states were not prepared for this catastrophic event

Massive communications damage and a failure to adequately plan for alternatives impaired response efforts, command and control, and situational awareness

Command and control was impaired at all levels, delaying relief

The military played an invaluable role, but coordination was lacking

Medical care and evacuations suffered from a lack of advance preparations, inadequate communications, and difficulties coordinating efforts

Long-standing weaknesses and the magnitude of the disaster overwhelmed FEMA’s ability to provide emergency shelter and temporary housing

FEMA logistics and contracting systems did not support a targeted, massive, and sustained provision of commodities

Contributions by charitable organizations assisted many in need, but the American Red Cross and others faced challenges due to the size of the mission, inadequate logistics capacity, and a disorganized shelter process

The committee makes the point this disaster not only was predictable, but predicted, and expresses dismay that the response could have been so poor with so much advanced notice. It finds this particularly distressing in the face of the risk of terrorist attack, and the oncoming 2006 hurricane season. I wonder how well we’re going to respond to a really slow-moving oncoming disaster.